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ESSAY
THE DOUBLE STANDARD IN JUDICIAL SELECTION *
Edwin Meese III **
The most recent confirmation proceedings for nominees to the
Supreme Court of the United States were predictably contentious.
The politics of advice and consent for both Judge John Roberts to
be the Chief Justice of the United States and Judge Samuel Alito
to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court were in many
ways more akin to political campaigns than to confirmation hear-
ings as we once understood them. There were radio and television
ads; there were demonstrations and rallies; there were full-page
newspaper advertisements; and groups on both sides routinely
held press conferences to get their views out. Some political ob-
servers estimated that interest groups on both sides would pour
millions of dollars into supporting or objecting to the Roberts and
Alito nominations.'
Unfortunately, these most recent confirmation processes were
not isolated events, but rather reflected the battle for the federal
judiciary that has been going on for quite some time. The starting
point, in many ways, was President Ronald Reagan's nomination
* This essay was adapted from a lecture delivered to the Federalist Society at the
University of Richmond School of Law on February 21, 2006. For the convenience of the
reader, these remarks have been slightly edited from the form in which they were deliv-
ered as a speech.
** Edwin Meese III was the 75th Attorney General of the United States. He is cur-
rently the Ronald Reagan Senior Fellow in Public Policy at the Heritage Foundation.
1. See Glen Justice & Aron Pilhofer, Set for Alito Battle, With Ad Dollars at the
Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at A3 (discussing the multi-million dollar expenditures
interest groups made in anticipation of Justice Alito's confirmation hearings); see also Rick
Klein, Ad War Targets N.E. Senators on Alito Nomination, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 18, 2005,
at A3 (describing various interest groups' advertising efforts in New England states).
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in 1987 of Judge Robert H. Bork to the highest court. Bork was
one of the most distinguished and qualified people ever nomi-
nated to the Supreme Court: Yale law professor, leading scholar
in antitrust and constitutional law, Solicitor General of the
United States, and a judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. As everyone knows, the un-
precedented ideological attacks on Judge Bork were sadly suc-
cessful and he was not confirmed.
The success of Bork's opponents in blocking his appointment
established a new standard for the politics of judicial selection. It
inspired the growth of well-funded political groups, primarily on
the far left of the ideological spectrum, whose primary objective
has been to stage all-out efforts to prevent the confirmation of
judges who, like Judge Bork, might believe in the faithful inter-
pretation of the Constitution according to its actual language and
its original meaning. The focus of these attacks has been nomi-
nees who believe that under the Constitution the role of the judi-
ciary is a limited one. In short, there have been attacks against
nominees who believe in judicial restraint, the idea that policy-
making and law-making are the preserve of the elected branches.
It is precisely this notion of judicial restraint that motivates
these political activists on the far left. These groups have a politi-
cal agenda that they themselves know is too radical to get
through the Congress of the United States or through any state
legislature-at least any state legislature whose members are
trying to get re-elected in the next election. As a result, their ef-
forts are aimed at persuading activist judges to exceed their le-
gitimate roles and to become lawmakers. From this point of view,
it is simply imperative to prevent constitutionally faithful judges
from ascending to the bench.
Ultimately, the goal of the radical left in this battle for the
courts goes beyond particular policies. The true goal, as Professor
Richard Epstein has written, is to exclude, from the bench, views
of judicial restraint and fidelity to the Constitution in order to
frame the constitutional agenda for the next generation.2 Some of
these groups are well known-People for the American Way and
the so-called Alliance for Justice, for example. But they have also
2. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, How PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION, at xii-
xiii (2006).
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drawn fellow travelers to their cause from such otherwise legiti-
mate and mainstream organizations as Americans United for
Separation of Church and State and even the NAACP. And unfor-
tunately, some of the nation's major newspapers aid and abet
them editorially.
In recent years, these groups have undertaken to broaden the
scope of their attacks. No longer do they limit their schemes to
trying to halt nominees to the Supreme Court. Since 2001 there
has been a systematic effort to target nominees at all levels of the
federal judiciary, with special attention being given to nominees
to the United States Courts of Appeal. The critical reason for this
shift in tactics is quite simple: most constitutional law in the
United States is not made by the Supreme Court-the Justices
only take 80-100 cases a year, after all-leaving much law to be
fashioned by the appellate courts in the various circuits around
the country. What was once sporadic has become commonplace;
and tactics have become so extreme that for the first time in his-
tory the United States Senate has used the filibuster against fed-
eral appellate nominees who would easily have been confirmed if
they had been afforded the opportunity for an up-or-down vote on
the floor of the Senate as is constitutionally expected.
The substance of the attacks has also grown increasingly scur-
rilous. Hearings in many ways are now less concerned with
measuring the professional fitness of a nominee to serve as a
judge or Justice than they are with attempting to intimidate the
person. Such intimidation comes in the form of seeking to force
the nominees to reveal how they would vote on cases they have
not yet seen, based on laws they cannot really know in advance,
and derived from fact situations that are wholly the hypothetical
constructs of their interrogators. Since that might not be suffi-
cient, the hearings are also used to dredge up a great deal of ir-
relevant material, such as memberships in organizations as far
back as their college or law school days. And, of course, there are
always the efforts at simple character assassination. To say that
much of the questioning a nominee faces is hostile would be to
sorely understate the case.
I have suggested that these sad and troubling developments
have been largely the handiwork of groups at the far-left end of
American politics. One can see this clearly in the evidence that
exists which demonstrates an unmistakable double standard for
judicial confirmations in the country. There is no denying what
2007]
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happened to Robert Bork or Clarence Thomas, or more recently to
John Roberts and Samuel Alito. But it was not that way during
the Clinton Administration. For example, when President Clinton
nominated Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court, she was
accorded great courtesy by the Republicans who respected the
fact that a president has the right to select a nominee of his
choosing provided that nominee is qualified. Even though Justice
Ginsburg was arguably farther to the left than anyone nominated
by recent Republican presidents has been to the right, she was
approved by a vote of 96-3. Similarly, Stephen Breyer, who had
served as a staff member for Senator Edward M. Kennedy and
who was well known as a liberal law professor at Harvard, was
confirmed 87-8.
President Clinton's prerogative was not challenged, and his
nominees were treated fairly by the Republicans as the party in
opposition. No one ever suggested the idea of a filibuster against
either Ginsburg or Breyer-nor, for that matter, against any of
the lower court judicial nominees named by President Clinton. It
is striking to note as a measure of how things have changed that
the Democrats, who were most forceful in trying to get any infor-
mation on Roberts and Alito that would have been harmful to
them, were the very same Democrats who counseled Justice Gins-
burg during her hearings that she did not have to answer any
questions she thought inappropriate. One can only imagine the
furor had Ginsburg been pressured to produce all the memoranda
she had written for the American Civil Liberties Union when she
was general counsel; or if Breyer had been badgered to produce
all the documents in which he had advised Senator Kennedy. But
such did not occur because of the double standard that threatens
our independent judiciary.
The consequences of these recent confirmation struggles are
serious for many reasons. Obviously, they are troubling for the
nominees themselves. The pressure put on them is tremendous,
and neither the nominees nor there are families shielded from the
hostile and often mean-spirited attacks on their characters as
well as their convictions. One can never forget Mrs. Alito leaving
the hearing room in tears. This leads to a second serious problem.
Such procedures may well discourage potential nominees in the
future from subjecting themselves to the trial by ordeal for a judi-
cial appointment. But the deepest problem goes beyond the nomi-
nees and even beyond the courts themselves. The new politics of
[Vol. 41:369
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judicial selection adversely affects our entire society by making
the confirmation process nothing less than a battleground for the
culture wars. It does not matter whether a nominee will be a good
and disinterested judge settling cases and controversies fairly;
what matters is how the judge will vote on the hot button issues
such as abortion, homosexual rights, and references to God in the
public square.3
This is far from what the Founders had in mind. Of the many
important things that came out of the Constitutional Convention
that steamy summer of 1787 in Philadelphia, two things were es-
pecially important, and it is those two things most threatened by
the new politics surrounding judicial appointments. The first im-
portant matter was the Founders' commitment to a written con-
stitution of enumerated and ratified powers and limitations. The
second achievement was the creation of an independent judiciary.
The Framers were well aware of the unpredictability of the
way power might be exercised under the unwritten British consti-
tution. Believing that a constitution properly understood was the
binding expression of the intentions of the sovereign people, they
were committed to the idea that the fundamental law could only
be changed by that same sovereign people through what Alexan-
der Hamilton described as the "solemn and authoritative act" of
formal amendment.4 No institution created by the Constitution-
not the legislature, not the executive, and not the judiciary-
could by enactment, policy, or decree change the original meaning
of the people as expressed in their basic law. This was why Chief
Justice John Marshall in his famous opinion in Marbury v. Madi-
son 5 unambiguously proclaimed the written constitution to be
"the greatest improvement on political institutions. "
This idea of a constitution-the provisions of which were to be
understood as both "fundamental" and "permanent"-was inti-
mately connected to the idea of an independent judiciary.7 In or-
der to vest the courts with the power of what we would come to
3. See CHARLES PICKERING, SUPREME CHAOS: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL CONFIRM-
ATION & THE CULTURE WAR 18 (2005).
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 527-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
5. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6. Id. at 178.
7. Id. at 176.
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call judicial review, the power to declare laws unconstitutional,
the Framers insisted that the judges had to be independent from
the politics of their day, from the whims and passions that might
pass through the society at any given moment. This independence
was necessary to enable them to interpret faithfully the language
of the Constitution as it was originally intended and to faithfully
interpret the laws as they were actually passed without the fear
of political retribution. This independence was secured in the
Constitution by providing for the judges and Justices to hold their
positions "during good [blehavior," and to protect their compensa-
tion from being reduced during their tenure.' The judges could
only be removed for bad behavior by the complex and cumber-
some process of impeachment.
The Founders had in mind a constitution that would be a solid
and dependable foundation for judging, not what we might think
of as a trampoline for activist judges to jump off in all directions
substituting their own policy preferences, political biases, or per-
sonal moral judgments for what the Constitution and the laws
made pursuant to it actually say. Justice Antonin Scalia, never at
a loss for sharp and wise words, excoriated judicial activism this
way:
What secret knowledge, one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers
when they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to dis-
cern that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not
clearly proscribe, and which our people have regarded as constitu-
tional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?9
Such an exercise of judicial power was simply beyond the pale,
Scalia thought. "Day by day, case by case," he concluded, the Su-
preme Court "is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do
not recognize."1 °
Professor Lino Graglia has argued in a similar vein that judi-
cial activism does great harm to the people themselves by distort-
ing the Constitution. Rightly revered as "a guarantor of basic
rights," he wrote, "the Constitution has been made the means of
depriving us of our most essential right, the right of self-
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1996) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting).
10. Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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government."11 The fact is "contemporary constitutional law ...
has very little to do with the Constitution."'12 Under the scheme of
government by judiciary that has been imposed on the people, the
Justices of the Supreme Court "have chosen to make themselves
the final lawmakers on most of the basic issues of domestic social
policy in American society."13 And these are the very issues,
Graglia concludes, "that determine the basic values, nature, and
quality of a society." 4
This debate about the proper nature and extent of judicial
power is what the battles over confirmations of nominees to the
federal courts are really all about. Even a brief look at the cases
shows the rather dire assessments of Justice Scalia and Professor
Graglia to be true. Consider cases as early as the 1960s-Baker v.
Carr5 and Reynolds v. Sims16-in which the Supreme Court de-
termined how the states could allocate the seats in their legisla-
tures. Up until that time, the states had followed the same pat-
tern as Congress, with an upper house based on geographical
jurisdictions and a lower house based on population. But the Su-
preme Court said such apportionment by the federal model was
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 A constitutionally acceptable model for appor-
tionment had to reflect the idea that all votes were equal, hence
the shorthand notion of "one-man, one-vote." It is safe to say that
had the founding generation of Americans even suspected that
one day the Supreme Court might decree how the states must
fashion their own legislatures under their own constitutions, the
Constitution might never have been ratified, leaving us with a
form of confederal government far different than we have.
In many ways, one sees judicial activism at its worst in the
area of criminal procedure. In Miranda v. Arizona,'" the Court
decreed that the police had to give the now well-known warning-
11. Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law Without the Constitution: The Supreme
Court's Remaking of America, in "A COUNTRY I Do NOT RECOGNIZE": THE LEGAL ASSAULT
ON AMERICAN VALUES 1, 2 (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3.
15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. Id. at 575-76.
18. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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thanks to generations of television shows-that suspects had the
right to remain silent, to have a lawyer, and so forth. At the time
of Miranda, the Court suggested that the warning was not a con-
stitutional requirement but only a prophylactic requirement of
the Court. Subsequent efforts to get rid of the Miranda warning
led to the recent case of Dickerson v. United States.19 In that case,
in an opinion written by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, a
long-time critic of Miranda, a majority of the Court held that time
had somehow transformed what had once been merely a prophy-
lactic requirement into a full-blown constitutional demand.2 ° In
other words, the Justices openly read into the Constitution a
meaning that they had specifically said was not there just a few
decades before.
Finally, there is a tendency in recent Supreme Court opinions
that can only trouble those committed to a faithful interpretation
of the Constitution, and that is the willingness of the Justices to
look to foreign courts and foreign law to support their interpreta-
tions when they cannot find adequate grounds for their decisions
in the legal tradition of the United States.2 In this, what he has
called the internationalization of American constitutional law,
Judge Bork says that "[ilt may seem bizarre that the Constitution
of the United States, written and ratified over two hundred years
ago, should be interpreted with the guidance of today's foreign
court decisions and even the nonbinding resolutions of interna-
tional organizations."2 But it does not seem at all preposterous to
some of the Justices of the Supreme Court or to the elites to
whom they respond. As Professor Michael Dorf points out, in a
recent study of the Supreme Court there is something now known
as the "Greenhouse Effect," the influence on some of the Justices
by the praise or criticism of them offered by the Supreme Court
reporter for the New York Times, Linda Greenhouse. 23 Green-
house has approvingly noted that "it is not surprising that the
19. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
20. Id. at 437-44.
21. See, for example, the opinion of Justice Anthony Kennedy in Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
22. Robert H. Bork, Introduction to "A COUNTRY I Do NOT RECOGNIZE": THE LEGAL
ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES, at ix, xi-xii (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005).
23. Michael C. Doff, The Hidden International Influence in the Supreme Court Deci-
sion Barring Executions of the Mentally Retarded, in FOURTH ANNUAL SUPREME COURT
REVIEW: OCTOBER 2001 TERM 109, 115 (Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwartz eds.,
2002).
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justices have begun to see themselves as participants in a world-
wide constitutional conversation." 24 But as Judge Bork sharply
put it, "She might more accurately have said 'a worldwide consti-
tutional convention.'
25
I am convinced that if the people of the United States under-
stand the stakes that are involved, and understand the respective
merits of the two sides in this great debate, that they will also
understand the importance to our culture of preserving a Consti-
tution that leaves political decisions to the people's representa-
tives in order to preserve the people's most fundamental right,
the right to be self-governing. Our Constitution has served our
nation well for over two centuries and has been imitated through-
out the world, and we should respect our fundamental law by re-
storing the dignity and civility to the process of confirming judges
and Justices.
We must return to a process where judicial nominees will be
treated with the respect owed to the high public officials they are
going to be. Let us replace the uncivilized and vicious attacks
with a civilized and vigorous assessment of their intellectual
qualifications and their professional experience, making sure
they possess the integrity that they must have to serve as the
stewards of the rule of law. The process of judicial confirmation
must be carried out in a way that will benefit both the legacy of
the Founders who gave us our Constitution and the kind of judges
and Justices we would like to see on our courts. There can only be
one standard; anything other than that will be a profound failure
on our part.
24. Linda Greenhouse, Ideas & Trends: Evolving Opinions; Heartfelt Words from the
Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2006, § 4, at 3.
25. Bork, supra note 22, at xii.
2007]

